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Abstract 
Mid-nineteenth century Denmark was a center of Lutheran Chlistianity characterized by 
dry, passionless, ritualism. All citizens were member of the state church, and thus 
considered Chlistian, but the churches themselves did not proclaim the Gospel in a way 
commensurate with their namesake, Mmiin Luther. Into this spilitual wasteland stepped 
Soren Kierkegaard. An outspoken clitic of the Danish Church, Kierkegaard sought to 
proclaim the true Christianity to the people of Denmark. Generally, Kierkegaard's 
wlitings reflect the central theological tenets of the refol1ner himself, but many places in 
his wliting appear to reflect some SOli of synergistic position with regards to salvation. 
On the one hand, he admits that humans can do nothing towards salvation, but on the 
other that a committed act of the will is necessary in one's relation to God. The goal of 
this paper is to show that Kierkegaard affinned a legitimate personal freedom with regard 
to salvation. It will also be shown that his affim1ation of this freedom does not mean that 
he thought man could cooperate with God to effect salvation (synergism). These goals 
will be achieved through an examination of the relevant material in the works of 
Kierkegaard. Properly understood, those passages in the published works which appear 
to affirm synergism really affinn no such position. It is not until 1852, after the 
published corpus, that Kierkegaard begins to affinn synergism. 
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Kierkegaard and the Freedom of the Will 
Soren Kierkegaard is one of the most misunderstood and controversial thinkers in 
modern history. He was bom in Denmark in 1813. The philosophical era into which he 
was bom and grew up was the golden age of Gelman idealism. His own philosophical 
thought, although difficult to place neatly in the flow ofthe history of philosophy, was 
largely a response to the Hegelianism of his time. Hegelianism, as Kierkegaard saw, 
touted universality over individuality. Kierkegaard's response was the radical emphasis 
on individuality, on the self. It is in this sense that he can be made to fit into this peliod 
of philosophical development.! Nevertheless, despite the histOlical placement of 
Kierkegaard, he defies more specific categorizing and spums assimilation into a 
philosophical school of thought of that time peliod? 
It is precisely in the nature of his reaction to Hegelianism that Kierkegaard defies 
classification. His response, which championed the individual over the collective, 
quickly evolved into a Christian polemic. The Lutheran state church had long since 
depmied iI'om the foundations of the faith as interpreted by the reformer Mmiin Luther 
himself. Kierkegaard, commenting on the dismal state of affairs within the church, noted 
that a Dane could live by plinciples antithetical to Christianity, in fact even deny the 
existence of God, and still call himself a Christian and be given a Christian burial when 
the time comes.3 Kierkegaard thus aimed his pen at the Danish church, which he 
I Frederick Copleston, A HistOJY of Philosophy, vol. 7. From the Post Kantian Idealists to Marx, 
. Kierkegaard, Clnd Nietzsche (New York: Image Books, 1963), 337. 
2 Roger Poole, "The Unknown Kierkegaard: Twentieth-Century Receptions," in The Cambridge 
Companion to Kierkegoard, eds. Alastair Hannay and Gordon D. Marino (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998),48-75. 
3 Soren Kierkegaard, The Point ofVielVfor Mv Work as All Author, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: 
Harper Torchbooks, 1962),22-23. 
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believed was no representative oftme, biblical Christianity. So, his philosophical 
individualism turned into a radical theological individualism in which the individual was 
wholly committed to Chlist. He states in his joumal, "But before God, the infinite spirit, 
all the millions who have lived and live now do not fonn a mass; he sees only 
individuals.,,4 Therefore, Kierkegaard may be considered just as much a theologian as a 
philosopher. And he was staunchly Lutheran in his theology. And as a Lutheran, he 
held, among other things, that man had done and could do nothing good in order to merit 
salvation. God does it all, and nothing concerning salvation can be attributed to man. 
Conceming the relationship between God and man, he wlites, in his joumal: 
DIVISIO 
There is an infinite, radical, qualitative difference between God and man. 
This means, or the expression for this is: the human person achieves 
absolutely nothing; it is God who gives everything; it is he who blings f01ih a 
person's faith, etc. 
This is grace, and this is Christianity's major premise. (Xl A 59 [lP 
2:1383]) 
Kierkegaard sees God and man as qualitatively distinct. His commentaries on the 
relationship between man and God demonstrate his enmity toward both the speculative 
philosophy of his day and the litualistic, impassionate church of Denmark. God can 
neither be reached by a gradual process of the intellect nor by jumping through celiain 
ecclesiastical hoops in a pmiicular order (baptism, confil111ation, marriage, and bmial). 
Despite this entry and several other places in his works that echo this point, there 
are just as many places where Kierkegaard seems to be an advocate of human freedom. 
4Soren Kierkegaard, Journals alld Papers: A Selection, trans. Alastair Hannay (London: Penguin Books, 
1996), 506. 
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In the same joumal entry in which he wlites that man and God are qualitatively different, 
he adds: 
SUBDIVISIO 
Although, of course, there can be nothing meritOlious, unconditionally 
nothing, in any action whatsoever, any more than faith could be melitorious ( for 
then the DIVISIO or major premise is dissolved and we are in the minor premise), 
this neveliheless does mean dming in childlikeness to be involved with God. 
If the DIVISIO is everything, then God is so infinitely sublime that there 
is no intrinsic or actual relationship between God and the individual human being. 
Therefore attention must be paid scrupulously to the SUBDIVISIO, 
without which the life of the single individual never gets off the ground. (X I A 59 
[JP 2:1383]) 
To some it may seem that Kierkegaard's theology smacks of synergism. If this were in 
fact the case, Kierkegaard would be less than Lutheran. Throughout his writings, 
Kierkegaard clearly defines the freedom he posits, and it is well within Chlistian 
Olihodoxy, and more pmiicularly within the Lutheran fold, at least when compared with 
the so-called Danish Lutheran Church of his day. In reality, Kierkegaard both aHill11s 
legitimate human freedom in salvation and rejects the idea that humans cooperate with 
God's grace to achieve salvation (known as synergism). 
Liberum Arbitruim 
In a lengthy joumal entry in the later pmi of his life, dated 1849 (which is the 
same year in which the above entry was penned), Kierkegaard 'mites: 
There is a pious suspicion about subjectivity, that as soon as the least 
concession is made to it will promptly become something melitOlious this is 
why objectivity must be emphasized. 
Fine. In order to constrain subjectivity, we are quite properly taught that 
no one is saved by works, but by grace and corresponding to that - by faith. 
Fine. 
But am I therefore unable to do something myself with regard to becoming 
a believer? Either we must answer this with an unconditioned "no," and then we 
have fatalistic election by grace, or we must make a little concession. The point is 
this - subjectivity is always under suspicion, and when it is established that we 
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are saved by faith, there is immediately the suspicion that too much has been 
conceded here. So an addition is made: But no one can give himself faith; it is a 
gift of God I must pray for. 
Fine, but then I myself can pray, or must we go further and say: No, 
praying (consequently praying for faith) is a gift of God which no man can give to 
himself; it must be given to him. And what then? Then to pray aright must again 
be given to me so that I may rightly pray for faith, etc. 
There are many, many envelopes - but there must still be one point or 
another where there is a halt at subjectivity. Making the scale so large, so 
difficult, can be commendable as a majestic expression for God's infInity, but 
subjectivity cannot be excluded, unless we want to have fatalism. (X2 A 301 [JP 
4:4551]) 
What is this "little concession" which must be made in order to avoid fatalism? 
Kierkegaard calls is "subjectivity," and, as will be shown, there are many places where he 
clearly speaks of human fl'eedom as having a role in salvation, but how great is this role, 
how little is the concession? 
In another joumal entry, this one dated 1852, Kierkegaard notes that one must die 
to the world to become a Christian, and that dying is an "act of freedom."s Two other 
entries, xS 59 and 79 (JP 3: 3770 and 3774) assign a role to freedom in salvation, as does 
a passage in Practice in Clzristianity.6 These are just a few of the passages where human 
freedom in salvation is at1im1ed. These teachings have led some people to maintain that 
Kierkegaard was in fact a synergist. Kierkegaard has been called an Arminian. 7 Evans, 
while acknowledging that faith and sin-consciousness are not produced by acts of the 
will, comes back and claims that they are nevertheless only produced in the individual if 
5Soren Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, vol. 3, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1970), entry 3769. 
6 Soren Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1991), 171. 
7 Timothy Jackson, "Am1inian Edification: Kierkegaard on Grace and Free Will," in The Cambridge 
Companion to Kierkegaard, eds. Alastair Hannay and Gordon D. Marino ( Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 252. 
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the individual wills it. 8 Perhaps this is Evans' understanding ofthe little "concession." 
However, for Kierkegaard to be put in the ranks of the synergists, he would have to 
espouse liberum arbitlium, because this view of the will is the foundation for synergism.9 
Evans calls this type of freedom "fonnal freedom."lo This is the freedom in which the 
will is not influenced one way or another by any causal agent. The will is light in the 
middle of the two options. Jackson, while he admits that Kierkegaard does not speak 
highly of the concept ofliberum arbitlium, claims that Kierkegaard really only rejects 
this concept when taken in isolation. I I In order to hold that Kierkegaard was a synergist, 
one must elevate his teachings on freedom ofthe will above his teachings on grace and 
man's relation to God. This is the elevation of the SUBDIVISIO over the DIVISIO, and 
while Kierkegaard acknowledged that the two must be taken together, he definitely 
asserted that, in the end, the DIVISIO must take precedence over the SUBDIVISIO. 
After all, grace is Chlistianity's "major premise." 
Trying to put Kierkegaard in the ranks of synergists by claiming that he did not 
reject outright liberum arbitrium is to ignore what he wrote about the subject. In 1842-43 
Kierkegaard wrote in his journal, "A perfectly disinterested will (equilibrium) is nothing, 
a chimera ... " 12 In another journal entry he records, "Freedom means to be capable. 
8 C. Stephen Evans, "Salvation, Sin and [-Iuman Freedom in Kierkegaard," in The Grace orGod and the 
TYi!! orMan: The Casefor A I'm inian iSI11 , ed. Clark Pinnock (Minneapolis: Bethany I-louse Publishers, 
1989),188. 
9 Craig Q. Hinkson, "Kierkegaard's Theology: Cross and Grace. The Lutheran and Idealist Traditions in 
His Thought." (Ph.D. diss .. University of Chicago, 1993). ISO. 
10 Evans, 185. 
II Jackson, 249. 
12 Soren Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, vol. 2, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970), entry 1241. 
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Good and evil exist nowhere outside freedom, since this very distinction comes into 
existence through freedom.,,13 Wliting under the pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis in 
The Concept a/Anxiety, Kierkegaard asselis that liberum arbitrium "no more existed in 
the world in the beginning than in a late period, because it is a nuisance for thought.,,14 
Not even Adam was neutrally poised between the choices which represented freedom. 
Adam's will, while originally not in bondage to sin, was not neutral in the sense that it 
was unaffected and uninfluenced by something. Hinkson notes, " ... wherever one tums in 
Kierkegaard's writings one encounters the denial that freedom is ever indifferent to the 
object that it chooses; either it immediately chooses the good and is matelially 
detennined by that choice, or it has chosen evil and become irrevocably stamped 
1 b .·1 S t 1ere y." -
Kierkegaard maintains that "sin came into the world by a s1n.,,16 This sin was a 
free act, but it occurred precisely because of Adam's captivation with his own freedom to 
choose between: liberum arbitlium. Haufniensis writes, "Henc"e anxiety is the dizziness 
of ffeedom, which emerges when the spirit wants to posit the synthesis and freedom 
looks down into its own possibility, laying hold of finiteness to suppOli itself. Freedom 
succumbs in this dizziness ... .In that very moment everything is changed, and freedom, 
when it again lises, sees that it is guilty." 17 
13 Journals and Papers, vol. 2, trans., entry 1249. 
14 Soren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, trans. Reidar Thomte (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1980).49. 
15 Hinkson. 152. (emphasis his) 
16 The Concept o{Anxiety, 32. 
17The Concept o!Anxiety, 6l. 
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Thomte comments, "Kierkegaard accepts the dogma that original or inherited sin 
is guilt." I 8 Yet Kierkegaard asserts that inhelited sin itself is paradoxical and that the 
only way sin can be understood to any extent is through Christianity. 19 In the Fragments, 
Kierkegaard, wliting under the guise of Johannes Climacus, addresses the bondage of the 
will which affects man and how setiously the will is affected. Man's choice to sin was a 
free choice, but one that was ilTevocable. Freedom came at a price, as did unfreedom, 
and for both the price was the soul's fi-ee choice and the sUlTender of the choice. Once 
the plice was paid, the deal was final. There could be no refunds, so to speak. By his 
tl'ee choice, man's will was made a slave to sin and thus unable to come to God; indeed, 
it is unwilling to come to God. So bad is the COlTuption, that the will actually wars 
against the Truth.~o In no sense is it now in the position tieely to choose between good 
and evil. 
So it can be seen that Kierkegaard vehemently denies liberum arbitrium yet 
maintains a freedom which has real matelial content and is detem1ined by that content. 
These claims about the two types of freedom extend all the way back to Adam and can be 
seen to continue into the present. So, in order to see how this matelial freedom relates to 
grace (and still exists), we must always keep in mind the assertion that the major premise 
in Christianity is grace. All of Kierkegaard's statements about freedom's place in 
salvation must be subordinated to, and understood in the light ot~ his teachings on grace. 
IS Reidar Thomte. Kierkegaard's Philosophy o/Religion, (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1948), 
164. 
19JoLl177als (flld Papers, vol. 2, entry 1530. 
20 Soren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), 15-1 7. 
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The Necessity and Primacy of Grace 
In the joumals Kierkegaard acknowledges that man is saved by grace (X3 A 269, 
X 5 A 64, Xe A 182). This grace is God doing all in salvation; man does nothing which 
merits this grace or aids it. Thus grace is necessary for salvation, and it is necessary 
precisely because of the qualitative distinction between man and God. This distinction is 
a result of a qualitative leap away from God, which is sin. In Sickness unto Death, 
Kierkegaard writes, "As a sinner, man is separated from God by the most yawning 
qualitative abyss. ,,21 
In order for a man to come to ChTist and be saved, the gap must be bridged. 
Recall that only through the revelation which is Chlistianity can sin be understood. In 
Fragments, Climacus writes, "The teacher, then, is the god himself, who, acting as the 
occasion, prompts the leamer to be reminded that he is untruth and is that through his 
own fault. But this state - to be untruth and to be that through one's own fault - what can 
we call it? Let us call it sin. 22 This revelation of sin-consciousness is an act of grace, and 
the consciousness of sin is absolutely necessary to becoming a Chlistian. In fact, only by 
this way can one enter into to Christianity.23 
The OtIense 
The individual must encounter Chlist in the light way in order for the revelation 
of sin-consciousness to OCCUr. 24 However, in order to reveal that truth to man and to 
reveal Himself as the Absolute, it was necessary for the One outside of space and time to 
11 Kierkegaard. The Sickness Unto Death. trans. Alastair Hannay (London: Penguin Books. 1989). 155. 
11 Fragments, 15. 
13Practice in ChristianiZv, 67-68. 
14 "Salvation. Sin, ... ," 188. 
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come into both space and time. As Evans argues, "In developing these concepts Climacus 
suggests that the God's historical appearance would be essential if a total transformation 
of the person is to be effected. ,,25 Yet this is inherently paradoxical to the natural man 
because his fallen reason cannot comprehend the concept of the God-Man. Climacus 
asselis, "Defined as the absolutely different, it [the Paradox] seems to be at the point of 
being disclosed, but not so, because the understanding cannot even think the absolutely 
different ... ,,26 
As Evans explains, "The Paradox is fundamentally above reason, not 
understandable (and thus if reason does not recognize its limits, the paradox will 
conflict).,,27 Sin, although it stems from the will, has so cOlTupted the intellect that 
natural reason cannot comprehend the paradox and thus takes offense at it. Anti-
Climacus describes the situation: 
Essentially offense is related to the composite of God and man, or to the God-
man .... It is either in relation to the loftiness that one is offended ... or the 
offense is in relation to the lowliness ... In the first f01111, the offense comes in 
such a way that I am not at all offended at the lowly man, but at his wanting me to 
believe that he is God. And if I have already believed this, then the offense comes 
from the other side, that he is supposed to be God - he, this lowly, powerless man 
who ... is capable of doing nothing.28 
It is offensive to fallen man that he is untruth and that he is to blame for that 
situation. And it is equally offensive to consider that God came to emih in order to reveal 
this and to rectify the problem. Another aspect of the offense occasioned by the Paradox 
is seen in the kel10sis passage in Philippians 2. The Paradox dies. Not only does he die, 
25 Evans. Fragments and Postscript .... 25. 
26 Philosophical Fragments, 45. 
27 Evans, Kierkeg{l([rd's Fragments ([nd PostscnjJt. 238. 
19 Practice in Christianity, 81-82. 
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but he dies for fallen man. The loftiness and lowliness are again involved. One might be 
offended that such a lofty man would die willingly. Conversely, one may be offended 
because the death of a lowly man is said to accomplish so much, even the salvation ofthe 
entire world. When confronted with the scene desclibed by Anti-Climacus, fallen human 
reason simply cannot comprehend it. It is foolishness. 
The very fact that there is even a problem, sin, is also cause for offense. The 
Paradox came, but He came for a reason, to reconcile men to Himself. But the very fact 
that reconciliation is needed is likewise offensive to man. Sin is that qualitative 
difference which both separates man from God and prevents man from even realizing that 
there is a qualitative difference. The very revelation ofthis qualitative difference, which 
must come from the Paradox, is oiTensive. Hemlann Diem wlites, "Instead, this 
revelation encounters him as a paradox that challenges not only a man's intellect, but his 
entire existence ... it always involves the possibility that the man to whom it comes will 
not believe it, but instead by offended by it.,,29 
Kierkegaard remarks that what is crucial to understanding this offense at sin is the 
Christian specification: before God. Beiore God one stands alone as an individual, an 
entity in oneself, not as mere pmi of a greater whole. As a result, sin is shown truly to be 
one's own sin against God; and yet the true impOliance of the individual is also revealed. 
And it is this, too, that the natural man cannot stand. He is offended: 
because it [Christianity] is too exalted for him, because he cannot make sense of 
it, because he cannot be open and frank in the face of it, and therefore must have 
it removed, made into nothing, into madness and nonsense, for it is as if it were 
about to choke him.30 
19 Hermann Diem, Kierkegaard: All Introduction, (Richmond: John Knox Press. 1967),68. 
30The Sickness Unto Death, 118. 
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The Order of Salvation 
In order to overcome the offense at the Paradox, man must have faith. But faith is 
something that can only come from God. It is the condition that is necessary to "come to 
an understanding with this paradox ... ,,31 Climacus continues by giving a basic 
descliption of the process by which one understands the Paradox via the granting ofthe 
condition of faith: 
It occurs when the understanding and the paradox happily encounter each other in 
the moment, when the understanding steps aside and the paradox gives itselt~ and 
the third something, the something in which this occurs (for it does not occur 
through the understanding, which is discharged, or through the paradox, which 
gives itself consequently in something), is that happy passion to which we shall 
now give a name, although for us it is not a matter of the name. We shall call it 
faith. This passion, then, must be that abovementioned condition that the paradox 
provides. Let us not forget this: if the paradox does not provide the condition, 
then the leamer is in possession of it; but ifhe is in possession of the condition, 
then he is eo ipso himself in truth, and the moment is only the moment of 
. 32 
occasIOn. 
If the leamer had the truth in him already and the condition were not given by the 
Paradox, one would be back in the Socratic framework and no' longer in Christianity. 
This statement by Climacus is evidence against synergism because Kierkegaard is saying 
the Paradox (i.e. the God in time) must give faith; that faith comes from olltside of man. 
The only altemative to this is faith already being inside man, and this is not Christianity. 
Fmihen11ore, man does not and cannot ask for this condition, because, as Climacus points 
out, his understanding, or reason, must "step aside" or be "discharged" in order for faith 
to make room for the Paradox. 
31 Fragments, 59. 
31 Fragments, 59. 
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As Climacus points out, faith is not a knowledge.33 This conception of faith is 
consistent with what the author of Hebrews wlites about faith: "Faith is the substance of 
things hoped for, the evi dence of things not seen." (Heb. 11: 1) The word "seen" in the 
Greek could also be translated "understood. ,,34 To Kierkegaard, as to the author of 
Hebrews, faith is the evidence of God, who cannot be directly understood. Faith is the 
vehicle for salvation, not human reason, in that while the Paradox itself cannot be 
understood, the reality and impOliance of the Paradox is understood by faith. 
Actually, Climacus calls faith a "paradox" as well. He even calls it a "miracle." 
He writes, "Faith itself is a wonder, and everything that is true of the paradox is also true 
offaith.,,35 The follower realizes that without faith, he would not be able to accept the 
truth that is the Paradox. Fmihem1ore, that follower realizes that he did nothing even to 
get or eam faith, for it was by the faith that was given him that he realized he was 
untruth, a state which automatically precluded him from being able to merit or ask for the 
condition. 
This giving of the condition is logically antecedent to the revelation of one's 
sinfulness. Climacus states, "So it is with the follower who knows that without the 
condition he would have seen nothing, inasmuch as the first thing he understood was that 
he himself was untruth.,,36 Recall that this realization of being untruth is the 
33 Fragments, 62. 
34 Robert Young. Young's Analytical Concordance to the Bible, (Peabody. MA: Hendrickson Publishers), 
851. 
35 Fragments, 65. 
36 Fragments, 65. 
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consciousness of sin. In fact, faith and sin-consciousness can be viewed as two sides of 
the same coin. 
Conversion, for Climacus, is that change which took place in the individual after 
he received the condition. Because the condition also makes the man realize that he is 
untruth through his own fault, the conversion experience is also characterized by 
repentance. Climacus states, "Let us call such sorrow repentance, for what else is 
repentance, which does indeed look back, but neveliheless in such a way that precisely 
thereby it quickens its pace toward what lies ahead!,,37 Camell notes that this repentance 
comes from the realization that " ... life is nothing without God.,,38 
Climacus notes that conversion means that the person has become qualitatively 
ditIerent. Salvation is a radical change in the person so that he becomes another than he 
was before. This "new person," as Climacus calls it, has become that way as result of a 
transition he calls "rebilih." He writes: "Inasmuch as he was in untruth and now along 
with the condition receives the truth, a change takes place in him like the change from 
'9 
"not to be" to "to be." ... Let us call this transition rebirth ... ,,~ 
To summarize, an unsaved man is given the condition, faith, which is a kind of 
"seeing" ("faith's autopsy" or "self-seeing," Climacus calls it). By this condition he 
understands the truth, which is Chlist. Climacus also says that he "receives" the truth by 
this condition. In this moment also comes the knowledge of sin, which, again because of 
the condition, causes the person to repent. Conversion can, then, be described as tuming 
37 Fragments, 18-19. 
38 Edward John Carnell. The Burden o(,Sorel1 Kierkeguard, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1965), 144. 
39 Fragl11 ents, 19. 
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to God and thus away from sin; it is a qualitative lifestyle change. As Climacus put it, 
"he was turned around.,,4o But the change is more than one oflifestyle, it is really like 
stmiing life anew, and thus is called the rebirth. So rebilih coincides with conversion. As 
one turns towards God and away from sin, one embarks on a new direction and is 
"reboill." 
Freedom: Its Necessity and Role 
It is clear then, that Kierkegaard makes a proper defense of his own DIVISIO. 
Salvation is initiated and completed by God. Yet it must be remembered that the 
SUBDIVISIO cannot be left out. Human freedom fits somewhere into salvation. 
However, while the SUBDIVISIO is defended, it is done so in the context ofthe 
DIVISIO. It should be kept in mind that after the published works (1852), towards the 
end of Kierkegaard's life, his thinking does begin to shift and his wliting contains a 
synergistic tone. Hinkson correctly points this out, but neveliheless insists that "the 
weight of evidence prior to the final period indicates that SK has not always asclibed so 
much to man, and so little to God.,,4! Kierkegaard is sure to properly subordinate the 
SUBDIVISIO to the DIVISIO throughout his published corpus. Even so, despite the fact 
that the SUBDIVISIO is secondary, Kierkegaard still issues a powerful defense for it. He 
views human freedom and its implications as being essential to the Chlistian faith. His 
defense of freedom is just as well thought out as his defense of grace; in fact the two go 
hand-in-hand, as freedom must be understood within the context of grace. It is to his 
defense of the SUBDIVISIO, as subordinately related to the DIVISIO, that we now go. 
40 Fragments, 18. 
41 Hinkson, 159n, emphasis his. 
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Kierkegaard lays much of the foundation for his doctline of human freedom in his 
joumal. One particular entry reads, "The most tremendous thing conceded to man is -
choice, freedom. If you want to rescue and keep it, there is only one way - in the very 
same second unconditionally in full attachment [abandonment, devotion, or submission] 
give it back to God and yourself with it.,,42 In fact Kierkegaard goes so far as to say that 
freedom is a necessity. He even links the necessity of freedom with the doctrines of 
creation ex nihilo and the omnipotence of God. His joumal entry reads: 
... only omnipotence can make [a being] independent, ... only omnipotence can 
truly succeed in this [making man free]. Therefore if a man had the slightest 
independent existence over against God (with regard to materia). then God could 
not make him free. Creation out of nothing is once again the Almighty's 
expression for being able to make [a being] independent. He to whom lowe 
absolutely everything, although he still absolutely controls everything, has in fact 
made me independent. If in creating man God himselflost a little of his power, 
then precisely what he could not do would be to make man independent.43 
Freedom is necessitated by an omnipotent creator. Denying freedom is denying God's 
omnipotence and his ability to create at all. 
Defending Cll1istianity 
This line of thought especially was a reaction against Hegelianism. Although 
God's sovereignty and man's freedom appear to contradict one another, they actually 
must be simultaneously affim1ed in order for Cll1istianity to stand. Hinkson provides an 
insight into the way this is so, especially in relation to the philosophical milieu of the 
time. 
41 Journals and Papers. vol. 2, entry 1261. 
43 Journals ({nd Papers. vol. 2 entry 1251. 
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He comments that an overemphasis on either one would reduce God to mere immanence 
and destroy the qualitative distinction between God and man: 
An emphasis upon grace that would neglect man's fi'eedom issues in a 
monism that denies God's power to create entities distinct from himself; in effect, 
it makes of all things an ultimately homogenous divinity and therewith posits the 
dependency of God upon his creation. Conversely, an emphasis upon fi'eedom 
that would neglect God's grace issues in a monadism wherein man assumes the 
status of a demi-divinity.44 
Kierkegaard's theology does not scramble to rethink Olihodoxy to defend against a new 
challenger. Rather it can be seen that Olihodox Cll1istianity is strongest when all of its 
doctrines are affil111ed, even those which appear to contradict one another. 
Defending Monergism 
Kierkegaard affirms the traditional Refol111ation teaching that God's regenerative 
work precedes man's faith. This must be upheld in order to avoid synergism. Yet this 
would seem to imply that grace is being "forced" upon man, which is, in fact, what Anti-
Climacus affil111s: 
"But if the essentially Christian is something so telTifying and appalling, how in 
the world can anyone think of accepting Chlistianity?" Very simply and, if you 
wish that also, very Lutheranly: only the consciousness of sin can force one, if I 
dare to put it that way (from the other side grace is the force), into this hOlTor. 
And at that very same moment the essentially Christian transforms itself into and 
is sheer leniency, grace, love, and mercy. Considered in any other way 
Christianity is and must be a kind of madness or the greatest horror. Admittance 
is only through the consciousness of sin; to want to enter by any other road is high 
treason against Christianity.45 
As Anti-Climacus points out, there must be a tranSf0l111ation of the man "before" 
he accepts the "radical cure," and that transfoll11ation begins with the quickening of sin-
44 Hinkson, 158. (emphasis his) 
45practice in Christianity. 67-68. emphasis added 
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conSCIOusness. David Gouwens states succinctly: "Sin-consciousness, Kierkegaard often 
insists, is the prerequisite to faith; ... ,,46 Both are God's work, and not our own work. 
This commitment to Lutheran monergism can be seen in a joumal entry in which 
Kierkegaard states, "Heterodoxly one may say that conversion precedes and conditions 
the forgiveness of sins; Olihodoxly one may say: the forgiveness of sins precedes 
conversion and strengthens men truly to be convelied.,,47 That is to say, from the human 
perspective, we tum to God in repentance and faith, and He, in tum, grants the 
forgiveness of sin. But in actual fact, our tuming is preceded by a regenerative work of 
the Holy Spilit that causes us to receive forgiveness with joy and gratitude. Conversion 
and regeneration do occur simultaneously, though regeneration possesses logical priority 
in the ordo salutis. God forgives (wipes away) sin, thereby ending the separation between 
man and God, and a change occurs in the person as a result of this. 
Climacus, as we have seen, stresses that this complete transfol1nation ofthe 
individual takes place in the moment. Robeli C. Roberts adequately eases any tension 
that may mise between man's view and God's view. He writes, "So even if: at the 
moment of conversion, it looks phenomenologically as though one had, at least pmiially, 
by effOli come to faith, still one COlTects this judgment retrospectively by a dogmatic 
standard: God is entirely the author of one's faith.,,48 
If all this is true, what happened to freedom? It is still affimled. Man has a 
choice, but yet it is not a choice. 
46 David J. Gouwens. Kierkegaard as ReligioLls Thinker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1996). 
150. 
47 Journals alld Papers, vol. 2 entry 1206. 
48 Roberts. 98. 
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Kierkegaard's joul11al reads: 
Is it not a peculiar yet profound use oflanguage that someone may say: 
There is absolutely no question here of any choice - I choose this and 
that. ... Fmihel111ore, Christianity can say to a man: You shall choose the one thing 
needful, but in such a way that there must be no question of any choice - that is, if 
you fool around a long time, then you are not really choosing the one thing 
needful; like the kingdom of God, it must be chosenfirst. Consequently there is 
something in relation to which there must not be, and by definition there cannot 
be, a choice, and yet there is a choice. Consequently, the very fact that there is no 
choice expresses the tremendous passion or intensity with which one chooses. 
Can there be a more accurate expression for the fact that freedom of choice is 
only a fonnal condition of freedom and that emphasizing freedom of choice as 
such means the sure loss of freedom? The content offloeedom is decisive for 
freedom to such an extent that the very truth of freedom of choice is: there must 
be no choice, even though there is a choice. (X2 A 428 [2: 1261]) 
The freedom to which Kierkegaard refers cannot be liberum arbitrium inasmuch as it 
never existed. It is material freedom, the freedom detel111ined by its object. Grace is 
forcing one to a decision. In the joumal entry above, it is clear that grace has so 
compelled the will to choose Freedom, Christ, that although there at first seems to be a 
compulsion (no choice), there was in the realest sense a choice, because that choice was 
detennined by its object, which was the Truth. Man is free because he chose Freedom-
Itself. Hinkson clmifies: "Through the deprivation offonnal freedom (the elimination of 
all viable options, save one) man comes into possession of material-that is to say, real-
freedom, and finds himself able willingly to choose that to which he had hithelio only 
d · 1 b' d .. 49 gru gmg y su 111ltte .u 
Recall the joumal entry in which Kierkegaard states that the only way really to 
have freedom is to sUlTender it completely in the moment it is given. It is grace which 
gives this freedom, as well as the very ability to give freedom back. The regenerated 
man, having been given the condition and the revelation of sinfulness, must realize that 
49Hinkson, 167. emphasis his 
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the only response is to embrace the "radical cure." In that moment in which all of this 
occurs, he must take the "leap of faith." Evans notes, ""The leap is simply Climacus' 
metaphOlical way of emphasizing that the decision to become a Christian is a choice, a 
free personal decision.,,5o 
He must come to God in that moment, for only then can he be free. It is when he 
pauses to ponder fonnal freedom that he has really lost freedom. Kierkegaard wlites: 
Alas, but man is not sufficiently spirit. He thinks: Since the choice is left to men, 
I will take my own time and/irst of all think it over very earnestly. Tragic anti-
climax! "Eamestness" is precisely to choose God immediately and "first of all." 
And so man lies there and conjures with a phantom: freedom of choice, whether 
he has it or whether he does not, etc. --- and even does it in a scientific-scholarly 
way. He does not notice that he has missed freedom .... By staring fIxedly at 
"freedom of choice" instead of choosing, he loses both freedom and freedom of 
choice ... .If the sight of what is conceded to you tempts you, if you surrender to 
the temptation and look with selfish craving at freedom of choice, then you lose 
your freedom. 5 I 
Words such as "eamest" and "first of all" in the passage emphasize the subj ectivity of the 
choice. What is more, it must be done "immediately." This leap is a passionate one; 
faith is a matter of passion, and certainly not of reason, for it is reason which causes one 
to contemplate fonnal freedom and thus lose freedom. As Johannes de Silentio says in 
Fear and Trembling, "faith begins precisely where thinking leaves off.,,51 
This passionate subjectivity, or human willing, is that for which Kierkegaard 
mms. Remember that Climacus called faith a "happy passion." Eliciting this passion is 
the "compulsion" of grace which has undergone so total a transfom1ation that it is 
50 C. Stephan Evans, Kierkegaard's Fragmen/s and Postscript: The Religiolls Philosophy O(Johw111es 
Climacus, (Atlantic Highlands. NJ: Humanities Press, 1983),274. 
51 Journals and Papers, vol. 2. entry 1261. 
52 Fear and Trembling, 82. 
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expelienced as the opportunity to do good. Hinkson identifies this as a "Gestalt-shift,,,S3 
and writes: " ... through the constraining operation of grace, man's will is transferred from 
the evil to the good so that he is able to choose the latter.,,54 Evans goes so far as to 
define matelial freedom itself as "the ability to be the kind of person God is calling an 
indi vidual to be." 55 
So, there is freedom, but not synergism. The key to explaining that Kierkegaard's 
position is not synergism is demonstrating three things: 1) that Kierkegaard held that man 
could do nothing to merit salvation, 2) that Kierkegaard taught that the human will can 
contribute nothing toward salvation independently of grace, and 3) that Kierkegaard did 
not espouse a cooperation between the pre-regenerate will and grace in salvation. 
Man cannot merit salvation because he is untruth and positioned polemically 
against the truth. There is no independent working of the will because there is no liberum 
arbitrilll71, which would be necessary for man's will to work independently of God's, yet 
Kierkegaard tells us it never existed. Thus, it is all God workihg in man. FUlihennore, 
the will is not working alongside grace because without grace it would not have known 
anything to begin with. Instead of cooperating with grace, human will first comes to be 
as a result of grace. Thus grace's sole efficacy in making the will effectual is maintained 
and man's freedom is preserved.56 This free choice is just the will ratifying "the good in 
which it stands:,s7 and then having the ability to continue in the faith. 
DHinkson, 167-168. 
5"Hinkson.167. 
SS"Salvation, Sin, ... ," 185. 
56 Hinkson, 169-170. 
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The "little concession" really does seem to be "little" in light of an understanding 
of freedom and the necessity thereof. It is quite apparent that the concession is needed 
because the will must make a choice. This choice is easy to affinn once it is realized that 
what is conceded is "the choice that isn't a choice". 
Conclusion 
The issue of man's free will and God's sovereignty in the effecting of salvation is 
an issue that has been around since the dawn of Christianity and will be around until the 
retul11 of the Lord. In dealing with this issue, many theologians have emphasized one 
side of the issue at the expense of the other. This has often led to extremism on either 
side, characterized by more of a theoretical theology than a practical one. However, this 
is not the case with Soren Kierkegaard. 
While it may seem that he emphasized what he called the minor premise of 
Christianity (daring in a childlike way to be involved with God) over the major premise 
(the grace of God), he actually maintained a sound and systematic doctline of salvation 
based on these premises. For sure, it is easy to get caught up in all ofKierkegaard's 
material regarding the freedom that man has and his responsibility toward God. 
Nevertheless, Kierkegaard never gives man any credit over against God. In fact, a good 
summation of his view on man is a one-liner from Either/Or 11. The sennon that 
concludes the book is entitled, "That which is edifying in the thought that in relation to 
God, we are always in the wrong."S8 As loyal to the doctrines of Luther and the New 
Testament as he was, Kierkegaard always sought to maintain a practical theology. And 
57 Hinkson. 175. 
58 Soren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, II, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), 
339. 
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there is no better doctlinal controversy than this to call attention to the doctrinal 
cOlTectness and practical applicability of Ki erkegaard , teaching. 
While never affill11ing synergism, Kierkegaard neveliheless championed a 
personal act of freedom in salvation. Unlike most who uphold some freedom, he rejected 
liberum arbitrium. By accentuating matelial freedom and by emphasizing a logical (and 
thus simultaneous) order of salvation over a chronological one, Kierkegaard assured a 
balance between the divine and human agents in salvation. These main points were what 
truly enabled him to develop his teachings on the minor premise while still recognizing 
the primacy of the major premise. However, this balance did not take the form of 
crediting anything to man' s will. He never affill11ed any human merit in salvation or the 
operation of the will independently of grace. 
It is unfOliunate that Kierkegaard is grossly misunderstood by so many. Far from 
being the anti-Christian inationalist so many people take him for, Kierkegaard was a 
skilled theologian and philosopher who has a great deal to offer the 21 st century church. 
His teachings on grace and the freedom of the will especially would add a great deal to 
the CUlTent theological discussion among leading evangelicals. Whereas there are some 
already taking advantage of his works, they are in the minOlity. Mainstream 
evangelicalism, as well as the Chlistian church as a whole, should discover the true Soren 
Kierkegaard, the defender of grace and childlike faith. 
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